Elimination of the double tax on dividends; Statement of tax policy 3 by American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
University of Mississippi
eGrove
AICPA Professional Standards American Institute of Certified Public Accountants(AICPA) Historical Collection
1-1-1976
Elimination of the double tax on dividends;
Statement of tax policy 3
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_prof
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection at
eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in AICPA Professional Standards by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Elimination of the double tax on dividends; Statement of tax policy 3" (1976).




Elim ination o f 
the D ouble  Ta x  
on D ividends
CPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
3
Statements of Tax Policy of the federal tax 
division are issued for the general information 
of those interested in the subject. They 
present the conclusions of the division, which 
is the senior technical body of the Institute 
authorized to speak for the Institute in the 
area of federal income taxation.
Statements of Tax Policy are intended to aid 
in the development of federal tax legislation 
in directions which the division believes are 
in the public interest.
Statements of Tax Policy do not establish 
standards enforceable under the Institute’s 
Code of Professional Ethics and are not 
intended for that purpose.
statement of 
Tax Policy 3
Elim ination o f 
the D ou b le  T a x  
on D ividends
Issued by the Federal Taxation Division of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Copyright © 1976
American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants, Inc. 




Summary of Recommendations....................................................  1
Review of Current System ...........................................................  2
Alternatives Considered .................................................................. 10
The Partnership A pproach......................................................... 11
Repeal of the Corporate Income T a x .....................................  13
Expansion of the Dividends-Received Exclu sion ...............  14
Institution of a Dividends-Received C re d it..........................  15
The Dividends-Paid D eduction................................................  16
The “Gross-Up” M eth od .............................................................  21
Appendix 1
History of the Taxation of Corporate-Source
Income in the United States: 1909 to 1975 ..........................  25
Appendix 2
Corporate-Source Income: A Comparative Summary 
of Current Tax Systems in Selected C ountries.................... 30
Appendix 3
Comparison of Consequences Under Various Approaches 36
Foreword
Statements of Tax Policy represent a conscientious effort by 
the federal tax division of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants to explore, comment, and, where appropriate, 
develop positions on matters of tax policy covering major areas 
of taxation in which members of the accounting profession have 
special competence.
The present system of taxing corporate-source income has often 
been criticized as being a negative factor in the accumulation of 
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Summary of Recommendations
The Institute believes that the present tax treatment of corpo­
rate-source income does not measure up to accepted standards of 
tax equity, and that such treatment inhibits the growth and 
development of not only the corporate sector but all phases of 
the U.S. economy. Furthermore, the double-taxation of corporate- 
source income has added to the complexity of tax law administra­
tion.1 And finally, since the incidence  of the corporate income tax 
is unknown, the present system has hindered the Congress’s 
ability to predict the effect of proposed legislation and to thereby 
design the legislation that most accurately and effectively ac­
complishes its social and economic purposes. We believe that some 
measure of integration of the corporate and individual income 
taxes would alleviate these problem areas.
Based on our analysis of the various alternatives considered, 
we urge the adoption of either a dividends-paid deduction for 
corporations or a “gross-up” method of calculation that would 
allow a tax credit to shareholders for those taxes paid by the cor-
1 For example, the whole purpose of the collapsible corporation provisions 
of IRC Sec. 341 is to preclude the avoidance of the corporate income tax 
(with attendant recognition by the shareholders of stock appreciation at 
preferential long-term capital gain rates). Needless to say, IRC Sec. 341 
has to be one of the most complex provisions in the Internal Revenue 
Code.
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poration which are attributable to the income distributed as 
dividends. Properly structured, either alternative would be feas­
ible from an administrative standpoint and would correct many 
of the shortcomings of the current system of taxing corporate- 
source income.
Review of the Current System
Under present U.S. law, corporate-source income is subject to 
a two-tier system of taxation.2 Income is taxed first when it is 
earned by a corporation and again upon its distribution to share­
holders as dividends representing “current and accumulated earn­
ings and profits.” The issues to be considered here are whether 
such a system impairs the achievement of tax equity among 
various categories of taxpayers and to what extent the taxing 
system introduces distortions into the economy which inhibit 
domestic capital expansion and growth as well as competitive 
effectiveness in world markets.
Following are some of the major concerns that prompt recon­
sideration of the present system of taxing corporate-source in­
come.
L ack  o f Horizontal Equity. A system lacks horizontal equity 
when it maintains different income tax rates between share­
holders and other taxpayers. Since corporate earnings are subject 
to double taxation, the shareholder of a corporation does not 
effectively receive the same tax treatment accorded to the partner 
of a partnership or to the sole proprietor of a proprietorship. The 
same disparity exists when the tax treatment of corporate-source 
income is compared with that accorded to other classes of income 
such as wages, salaries, and interest. As a result of the imposition 
of such non-neutral corporate income taxes, otherwise econom­
ically sound business and investment decisions are distorted, re-
2 See Appendix 1 for a brief review of the history of taxation of corporate- 
source income in the United States.
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suiting in a reduction in the overall efficiency of the market 
system in the United States.3
Vertical Equity Is Not Achieved. Vertical equity refers to the 
tax burdens levied on persons at different income levels, presum­
ably to reflect societal views on ability to pay.4 Corporate-source 
income may be taxed more heavily at the low-income shareholder 
level than at the high-income level.5 Compare, for example, the 
effective tax rate imposed on dividend income received by a 
shareholder in the 20 percent tax bracket with that imposed on a 
70 percent tax bracket shareholder. Presuming a 48 percent cor­
porate tax bracket, the corporation pays each  o f these shareholders 
$520 out of earnings on which it has already paid $480 in corpo­
rate taxes. The 20 percent tax bracket shareholder pays an addi­
tional $104 of income taxes. This results in an effective tax rate 
of 58 percent on the dividend income. (Corporate taxes of $480 
plus individual taxes of $104, divided by before-tax earnings out 
of which the dividend was paid ($1000).) This represents a 192 
percent increase, (that is, 58 percent/20 percent) in the share­
holder’s effective tax rate. The 70 percent tax bracket shareholder 
pays an additional $364 on his dividends or an effective rate of 
84 percent. The increase in his effective tax rate, however, is only 
20 percent, as opposed to 192 percent for the 20 percent bracket 
shareholder.6 The tables on page 5 illustrate the regressive nature
3 See Charles E. McClure, “The Case of Integrating the Income Taxes,” 
National Tax Journal, September 1975, pp. 257-64.
4 McClure, “Integrating the Income Taxes,” p. 257.
5 As a matter of initial reaction, one might conclude that the observation 
overstates the problem since the number of low-income shareholders is 
probably less than those with high incomes. But what about those individ­
uals with low or modest incomes who hold stock indirectly through in­
terests in pension and profit-sharing plans? Needless to say the future 
value of any such rights has to be affected by the tax treatment presently 
accorded to corporate-source income. Furthermore, those tax-exempt or­
ganizations which benefit lower-income groups derive substantial income 
through ownership of corporate stock. Thus, vertical equity again suffers 
when corporate-source income is taxed at the corporate level.
6 This illustration does not take into account either the $25,000 corporate 
surtax exemption or the $100 exclusion applicable to the shareholder’s an­
nual dividend income.
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of taxing corporate-source income. The effect of the indirect 
corporate income tax conflicts with the socioeconomic principle 
that the tax burden should be at least mildly progressive and 
certainly not regressive.
M isallocation Betw een Corporate and Non-Corporate Sectors. 
Capital can be considered to be misallocated between the corpo­
rate and non-corporate sectors of the economy. Taxing corporate 
profits tends to increase the cost of capital to the corporate sector 
as investors seek to equalize the after-tax rate of return on cor­
porate and non-corporate capital. Consequently, capital (invest­
ment) will shift from the corporate to the non-corporate sector 
and the cost of capital in the corporate sector will rise. The 
before-tax rate of return will be higher in the corporate sector 
than in the non-corporate sector, once the after-tax rates are 
equalized by the reallocation of capital. This difference results in 
misallocation of capital since before-tax rates of return reflect the 
relative productivity of capital in various industries (e.g., capital 
is over supplied to the low-tax industries.)7 As mentioned previ­
ously, the ultimate result is that many situations will be tax- 
induced distortions of economic decisions.
N egative Im pact on Capital Accumulation. It can be argued 
that the present system of taxing corporate-source income has had
7 See A. C. Harberger, “The Corporation Income Tax: An Empirical Ap­
praisal,” in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Tax 
Revision Compendium, vol. 1, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, pp. 231-50; 
and A. C. Harberger, “Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income From Cap­
ital” in Effects of the Corporation Income Tax, ed. Marian Krzyzaniak 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966). A recent analysis by 
John B. Shoven, “The Incidence and Efficiency Effects of Taxes on In­
come From Capital,” Technical Report No. 173 of the Institute for 
Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (Stanford: Stanford Universi­
ty Press, July 1975), updated Harberger’s earlier estimates for the period 
of 1953-1959 and estimated the loss in income from the larger taxation of 
corporate income to be near $1.5 billion. On this basis one can estimate 
that for 1974 this figure would be near $5.0 billion. If we assume a 15 
percent rate of return on capital, the loss would have to be made up by 
an increase in the capital stock of $33 billion. This amount is equal to 
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a negative impact on capital accumulation and economic growth 
in the United States.8 First, since a relatively large fraction of 
property income is saved, the present system of double taxation 
has a disproportionately large impact on the overall saving rate 
(that is, smaller amounts are available for saving than would 
otherwise be the case). Second, to the extent that heavy taxation 
of corporate income lowers rates of return, the incentives to save 
are likely to be further inhibited. Finally, the corporate tax may 
have a separate effect on the incentive to invest.9 If corporations 
have a “target” after-tax rate of return which is necessary to com­
pensate them for the risks inherent in business investments, the 
corporate tax induces firms to forego marginal investments there­
by restricting capital accumulation and raising the necessary pre­
8 From 1869 to 1929 gross private domestic investment ranged from 20.6 
percent to 25.1 percent of gross national product based on decade aver­
ages. See Simon Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: Its Forma­
tion and Financing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 93. 
Since 1952, U.S. gross private domestic investment as a share of gross na­
tional product has been significantly lower, averaging only 15 percent. 
This rate of investment is lower than rates in all other developed Western 
economies with the possible exception of the United Kingdom, and it is 
only half the rate in such economies as Japan and the Soviet Union. See 
Edward F . Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ: Postwar Experiences in 
Nine Western Countries (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), 
p. 118. The present corporate tax system may well be a significant con­
tributor to the U.S.’s relatively low level of capital accumulation. See 
Frederick W. Hickman, “Tax Equity and the Need for Capital,” National 
Tax Journal, September 1975, pp. 282-91, for an excellent discussion of 
the reasons for this problem. See also Reginald H. Jones, “The Need for 
Capital,” National Tax Journal, September 1975, pp. 265-81. The pre­
cipitous drop in the saving rate and the corresponding decline in the 
ratio of corporate stock of plant and equipment to output both occurred 
contemporaneously with the substantial increase in corporate tax rates. See 
Thomas H. Mayor, “The Decline in the United States Capital-Output 
Ratio,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, July 1968, pp. 
495-516.
9 Recent empirical work on the determinants of investment indicate that 
increases in profits taxes do indeed retard investment unless offset by 
other factors. See, for example, Dale W. Jorgenson, “Economic Studies 
of Investment Behavior: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
December 1971, pp. 1111-47 and Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, 
“Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Reply and Further Results,” Amer­
ican Economic Review, June 1969, pp. 388-401.
6
tax return on investment projects. Since after-tax returns (but 
not pre-tax returns) have been relatively constant before and 
after the imposition of the corporate tax, this hypothesis appears 
consistent with the evidence.10 A significant proposition claims 
that lower capital accumulation leads to lower levels of plant and 
equipment per employed worker and hence to lower wages. 
Studies indicate that the negative long-run effects of reduced 
capital accumulation are not limited solely to the owners of cor­
porate capital.1
Danger o f W eakened  U.S. M arket Position, Since many other 
developed countries have adopted some form of partial integra­
tion of corporate and individual income taxes, the argument can 
be made that the U.S. system impairs our competitive position in 
world markets.12 See Appendix 2, page 30.
10 See William Fellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity (New York: 
Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1956), pp. 200-3.
1 See, for example, Marian Krzyzaniak, “Effects of Profits Taxes; Deduced 
From Neoclassical Growth Models” in Effects of Corporation Income Tax, 
ed. Marian Krzyzaniak (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1966). 
For further discussion, see Hickman, “Tax Equity and the Need for Cap­
ital,” National Tax Journal.
12 Integration also could serve as a means of competing for foreign capital. 
If the primary competitors of the United States introduce integration 
and/or dividend credits and extend it to nonresidents in order to attract 
investment, the United States will be at a disadvantage in attracting cap­
ital. Not only have capital markets become increasingly more interrelated 
in recent years but the United States unquestionably is now more de­
pendent on such markets. Other countries have been growing quicker and 
have been generating a larger share of world savings. Also, the increases 
in oil prices have transferred a great deal of wealth to Oil and Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations. As this wealth will be invested 
throughout the industrial world, it can be argued that tax-rate differentials 
no longer are irrelevant for the growth and long-run success of the United 
States in world markets. However, the benefits of lower tax rates on cor­
porate equity if also extended to foreigners have to be weighed against 
tax losses. The loss of revenues from profits accrued to residents can be re­
captured by other taxes but for foreign residents this may not be possible. 
Some forms of integration therefore might represent a net withdrawal of 
resources out of the United States (that is, the additional capital inflow 
would not be sufficient to offset the loss in tax revenue on foreign resi­
dents). See Richard M. Bird, “International Aspects of Integration,” Na­
tional Tax Journal, September 1975, pp. 302-14.
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Interest Is D eductible and Dividends Are Not. The tax-induced 
incentive for debt financing over equity financing is quite appar­
ent. Heavy reliance on debt financing, however, results in fixed 
interest commitments that aggravate the financial distress of many 
corporations—especially during periods of recession.13
Retention o f Earnings at Corporate Level. The present tax 
system encourages retention of earnings at the corporate level, 
particularly for smaller corporations. To avoid the tax imposed on 
dividend income, shareholders in control of corporate policy are 
motivated to retain corporate earnings at the corporate level and 
to eventually convert the stock appreciation attributable to such 
retention into preferential long-term capital g a i n s . 14 If the stock 
is held until death, any such appreciation will escape the income 
tax entirely by virtue of basis adjustments provided for in IRC 
Sec. 1014. Thus, encouraged by the operation of the present tax 
system, substantial amounts of funds are “locked-in” at the corpo­
rate level. Whether such accumulations are desirable from an 
economic standpoint, of course, depends upon how they are used 
by the corporation.15 The penalty tax (IRC  Sec. 531) imposed on
An interesting explanation of why corporations have not turned towards 
debt financing more often can be found in Joseph Stiglitz, “Taxation, Cor­
poration Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital,” The Journal of Public 
Economics, February 1973, pp. 1-34. In substance the rationale is that 
the double tax effect of the present system is partially avoided by with­
holding dividend distribution with the expectation that corporate growth 
will be recognized by the shareholders in the form of preferentially 
treated long-term capital gains upon a taxable disposition of their stock 
investment.
A few economists have suggested that integration of the corporate and 
individual income taxes is the most appropriate means for tightening the 
taxation of capital gains ordinarily attributable to the retention of earnings 
at the corporate level. See George Break, “Integrating Corporate and 
Personal Income Taxes: The Carter Commission Proposals,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1969, pp. 726-35; and Holland, “Stock­
holder Differential Taxation and Tax Relief,” in U.S. Congress, House, 
Committee on Ways and Means, Tax Revision Compendium, vol. 3, 86th 
Cong. 1st sess., 1959, pp. 1551, 1571-74.
There are, however, two more somewhat minor points, which represent 
further criticism of the present system. First, the tax incentives to retain 
earnings will distort the allocation of capital within the corporation. 
Mature firms with high rates of profits will retain and reinvest too much
8
earnings accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the busi­
ness, however, is designed to insure that earnings retained by 
the corporation are motivated by economic, rather than tax 
avoidance, objectives.
Tax Avoidance. The present system of double taxation has 
propagated countless tax avoidance schemes and has generated 
many complexities in the Internal Revenue Code designed to 
combat them. If, for example, double taxation is to be avoided 
at the corporate level, profits must be distributed in some form 
other than that of dividends. The choice of “interest” may cause 
a “thin” corporation problem (IRC  Sec. 385), while using “sala­
ries” could raise the unreasonable compensation issue (IR C  Sec. 
162(a) ( 1 ) ) .  On the other hand, if the double tax on corporate- 
source income is avoided at the shareholder level, withholding 
dividend distributions may bring into play the penalty tax on un­
reasonable accumulations of earnings (IR C  Secs. 531-537) or, in 
more limited situations, the personal holding company tax (IRC 
Secs. 541-547). Needless to say, these complexities add to the 
administrative burden imposed on the IRS and to the cost of tax­
payer compliance. Nor do they establish that type of climate all 
parties need and deserve to carry on their affairs with tax cer­
tainty.
Uncertainties o f the System. One of the primary drawbacks of 
the present system is uncertainty about the possible impact of 
governmental tax policy on the distribution of income and on 
economic efficiency. While a given amount of tax revenue raised
of their after-tax income since they recognize that stockholders prefer 
capital gains relative to dividends. Unless firms are quick to diversify, to 
expand their product lines, or to merge, new high-yielding ventures will 
be ignored while retained earnings will be invested in lower-yielding in­
vestments. The corporate income tax when couched with the preferred 
treatment of capital gains may act as major impediments to the formation 
of new firms and encourages economic concentration.
Second, the present system will segment the capital market into firms 
that tend to cater to high-income capital gains-oriented investors and those 
which will tend to pay out a larger proportion of their dividends to in­
vestors who are in lower tax brackets. This segmentation hampers diversi­
fication of portfolios of individual investors and complicates the invest­
ment and dividend pay-out decisions of corporate managers.
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via income taxes on individuals has relatively predictable impli­
cations for income distribution and economic efficiency, the same 
amount of revenue raised via a corporate income tax carries rela­
tively uncertain implications. This uncertainty is attributable both 
to a lack of knowledge about who owns the stock, and thus who 
is affected by the corporate tax, and to the possibility that part or 
all of the burden of the tax is being shifted to nonshareholders.16 
Much of this uncertainty could be eliminated by integrating the 
two taxes, since improved information about the impact of pro­
posed tax policy fosters better tax legislation. Thus, an important 
argument exists in favor of integration.
Alternatives Considered
Given that the present system of double taxation of corporate- 
source income is not satisfactory, what alternatives are available? 
Can a system of complete or partial integration of the corporate 
and individual income taxes be found which will achieve the ob­
jectives of tax equity and neutrality? To determine this, the In­
stitute has reviewed six possible alternatives:
The Partnership Approach 
Repeal of the Corporate Income Tax 
Expansion of the Dividends-Received Exclusion 
Institution of a Dividends-Received Credit 
Provision for a Dividends-Paid Deduction at the Corporate 
Level
The “Gross-Up” Method
Although the ultimate recommendations of the Institute favor 
the dividends-paid deduction or the gross-up method, each al­
ternative should be explored in order to provide a stronger basis 
for analysis and comparison.
It should be noted that the Institute is aware of the recom­
16 As shown by Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner, Who Bears the 
Tax Burden? (Washington, D .C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), the im­
pact of the corporate tax on income distribution and efficiency is highly 
sensitive to the possibility of a tax shift.
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mendations for integration proposed by the Honorable William 
E. Simon, secretary of the Treasury, before the House Ways and 
Means Committee on July 31, 1975. Referred to as the “half-and- 
half method” in his report, the proposal envisions a combination 
of our dividends-paid deduction alternative and the gross-up 
method. We favor the adoption of either alternative; but, any 
compromise between the two may solve the integration problem. 
It should be noted, however, that the half-and-half method is 
more complex than either the dividends-paid deduction method 
or the gross-up method. Thus, more difficult compliance and ad­
ministration problems could be expected with this form of inte­
gration.17 Although the half-and-half method is not discussed as a 
separate alternative, its effect is shown in Tables 1 and 2 of 
Appendix 3.
Assumptions Underlying the Alternatives. The analysis and 
recommendations set forth below are predicated on the following 
assumptions:
• If the corporate income tax is retained, the rate structure as 
presently constituted will not change. Although the recommenda­
tions made here could be simplified if the corporate income tax 
were a flat rate (for example, 50 percent of taxable income), 
elimination of the surtax exemption would not be politically 
feasible and would work a hardship on small and less profitable 
concerns.
• Revenue loss estimates resulting from the various alternatives 
are based upon information obtained from the Department of the 
Treasury.
The Partnership Approach
The corporate form would be disregarded for tax purposes, if 
it is presumed that a corporation, like a partnership, is in reality 
a conduit for its owners. Thus, this approach would eliminate the
17 The Institute agrees with the secretary’s recommendation that the bene­
fits of integration not be extended to shareholders who are tax-exempt 
organizations, but has taken no position as to the tax treatment of foreign 
shareholders.
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corporate income tax, with all corporate-source income being 
taxed at the shareholder level at an applicable marginal rate. 
Complete integration would result, with no distortion of vertical 
or horizontal tax equity. If corporate-source income were treated 
like any other income from capital, tax-induced investment de­
terrents in the corporate sector would be eliminated, and tax 
neutrality as to the choice of business organization could be 
achieved.
Disadvantages. Although a conceptually perfect alternative to 
the present tax system, the partnership approach seems almost 
impossible to implement. Some illustrations of the administrative 
problems that would be encountered in such a system follow.
• At the corporate level exact records would have to be maintained 
for every shareholder, regardless of how long the stock was 
owned.
• Intercorporate holdings would cause a time lag in the determi­
nation of the pass-through to the shareholder level unless corpo­
rations owning stock in other corporations were required to accrue 
their share of the income earned by the owned corporations.18
• Different classes of stock would further complicate the pass­
through allocation. If, for example, a corporation had both com­
mon and preferred stock outstanding, in any one year the excess 
of earnings attributable to the preferred stock would be allocated 
to the common shareholders. If the excess were not distributed 
but, instead, accumulated at the corporate level, it would still be 
taxed to the common shareholders. What if the excess was distrib­
uted to the preferred shareholders in a later year?19
• If partnership treatment is to be carried out in full, the identity 
of corporate-source income (for example, interest on state and 
local bonds, capital gains, and so forth) and certain deductions 
and losses (for example, charitable contribution deductions, cap­
ital losses, and so forth) would have to be preserved. Conse­
18 See the discussion in Charles E. McClure, Jr., “Integration of the Personal 
and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Re­
form Proposals,” Harvard Law Review, January 1975, p. 563.
19 This sort of problem is avoided in Subchapter S corporations by the one 
class of stock requirement of IRC Sec. 1371 (a) (4 ).
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quently, the pass-through allocation would be further complicated.
• At the shareholder level, constant adjustment in the basis of 
the stock investment ( for example, increases for pro rata shares of 
undistributed corporate profits) would impose a serious record­
keeping burden on all concerned.
• The partnership approach suffers from the real possibility that 
shareholders may be taxed on corporate income not received 
(that is, the “wherewithal-to-pay problem”). Although this prob­
lem exists with respect to the partnership form, partners generally 
have more control over fund withdrawals than the minority share­
holders of a large corporation.
A similar approach can, of course, be found in the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 under the provisions of Subchapter S. One 
might note, however, that the election is limited to corporations 
having no more than ten shareholders and possessing only one 
class of stock. With this precedent as a starting point, the partner­
ship approach might accommodate an even greater number of cor­
porations—but again with marked limitations due to the problems 
of administration. Surely, were Subchapter S to be used to carry 
out this lim ited  change, it should be amended to conform more 
closely to the tax treatment presently in effect for partnerships 
under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code.
Repeal of the Corporate Income Tax
Unlike the partnership approach, which would also eliminate 
the corporate income tax, repeal of the corporate income tax 
would continue taxing corporate-source income to shareholders, 
but only as it is distributed. Such an alternative would place a pre­
mium on corporate accumulations—which could be good or bad, 
depending on how these funds are utilized by the corporation. 
Naturally, the incentive to accumulate would be more of a prob­
lem with closely held corporations where control is lodged in 
the hands of those shareholders in higher marginal individual 
income tax brackets who would wish to use the corporate form as 
a tax deferral device.
Though repeal of the corporate income tax would eliminate the 
double tax on dividend distributions, it could lead to a lessening
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of the progressivity of the tax system. “Locked-in” earnings at the 
corporate level could be converted by a shareholder into prefer­
ential long-term capital gains upon a taxable sale or exchange of 
the stock.
Because of the tax avoidance potential at the shareholder level, 
the elimination of the corporate income tax would require other 
changes in the Internal Revenue Code. One change would be to 
treat any gain from the sale of a corporate stock investment as 
ordinary income. This could cause undue hardship ( in terms of a 
“bunching” effect) on a taxpayer that realizes appreciation at­
tributable to many years of corporate growth. Provision would 
have to be made, in the interest of equity, for the annual accruals 
of increases in stock values. Besides violating the wherewithal- 
to-pay concept and the notion, present throughout the Internal 
Revenue Code, that gains should only be recognized as actually 
realized through some sort of a sale or exchange, the practical 
difficulty of periodically determining changes in stock value 
should be apparent to all. However, the bunching of income in 
the year of sale might be alleviated through some sort of averag­
ing device.
Expansion of the Dividends-Received Exclusion
An expansion of the dividends-received exclusion, if a full ex­
clusion were allowed, would eliminate the double tax treatment of 
corporate-source income. But instead of approaching the problem 
from the standpoint of the corporation (that is, eliminating the 
corporate income tax), the solution concentrates on the share­
holder’s tax consequences. Stated simply, a shareholder would 
be allowed to exclude from gross income all qualified dividends 
received from domestic corporations. This alternative would not 
be novel in our present tax system, as is evidenced by the $100 
exclusion currently provided for by IRC Section 116.
Disadvantages. An expansion of the dividends-received exclu­
sion, even on a limited basis, would have the following major 
drawbacks. •
• It would not entirely resolve the debt-versus-equity problem. 
Corporations might still be inclined to favor debt financing over
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equity issues because interest payments would continue to be 
deductible while dividend distributions would not. Of course, it is 
reasonable to anticipate that the distortion between debt and 
equity financing currently existing would not be as pronounced 
because of investor pressures favoring equity investments and 
their nontaxable dividend distributions.
• The lack of vertical equity, inherent in the present system, 
would continue in an aggravated form. All shareholders, regard­
less of their marginal tax brackets, would be indirectly subject to 
a 48 percent tax. This would be true whether or not dividends 
were paid by the corporation since the corporate income tax 
would remain in effect. Thus a partial or complete dividend ex­
clusion would have a regressive effect on taxation of individual 
shareholders. The exclusion would favor those in higher tax 
brackets, since tax relief would vary in accordance with a share­
holder’s marginal tax rate.
Although they would be less pronounced than under the pres­
ent system, horizontal inconsistencies would persist. The dispar­
ity between the tax rates imposed on shareholders and those im­
posed on other taxpayers (partners, sole proprietors, and so forth) 
is not eliminated under this integration alternative.
• An exclusion at the shareholder level provides no relief for re­
tained corporate-source income.
Institution of a Dividends-Received Credit
IRC Section 34, effective for certain dividends received in tax­
able years ending after July 31, 1954, provided for a 4 percent 
credit limited to the shareholder-recipient’s taxable income. With 
a phase-out reduction in the percentage allowed as a credit, IRC 
Sec. 34 was repealed for dividends received after December 31, 
1964. Thus, the dividends-received credit alternative is not a new 
or untried approach to achieving partial integration of corporate 
and individual income taxes.
Disadvantages. Although less objectionable from a conceptual 
standpoint than the dividends-received exclusion, it carries the 
same major drawbacks (see the discussion in the prior section). 
Additionally, it would obviously favor high-bracket shareholders, 
which was the principal justification for the repeal of the 4 percent
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version (IR C  Sec. 34) in 1964. Tax inequity would further ma­
terialize if the credit (as was true with IRC Sec. 34) is limited to 
taxable income, since this would preclude some shareholders from 
taking advantage of part or all of the amount otherwise available. 
This last objection could be negated by allowing the full credit, 
irrespective of any limitations, even in cases where the share­
holder may be entitled to a refund. Alternatively, a system of 
carryovers could be utilized.
The Dividends-Paid Deduction
Allowing a corporation to claim a deduction for dividends paid 
to its shareholders would achieve integration but would require 
corollary modifications in the present tax system.
Adoption of a dividends-paid deduction should carry with it 
the repeal of IRC Section 243 and related provisions dealing with 
the dividends-received deduction (85 percent in most cases) al­
lowed to corporate distributees.
Attendant with the repeal of the dividends-received deduction, 
there appears to be no reason why the tax treatment of property 
distributions to corporate distributees ( IRC Section 301 ( b ) ( 1 )  
( B ) and related provisions) cannot be simplified. Since a step-up 
in basis can no longer be achieved by only a 15 percent inclusion 
in gross income, why not treat corporate and individual distribu­
tees equally? Thus, the fair market value of the property would 
be the measure of the dividend income, and such value would be­
come its basis in the hands of the distributee shareholder—wheth­
er individual or corporate. The deduction of the distributing cor­
poration should be limited to the corporation’s adjusted basis in 
the property distributed.
The Institute believes that the dividends-paid deduction should 
be denied with respect to dividends distributed to tax-exempt 
organizations.
The tax effect on the corporation and shareholders is illustrated 
in Tables 1 and 2 contained in Appendix 3.
Advantages
• Corporate-source income that is distributed  to shareholders 
would be taxed equitably—both from a horizontal and vertical
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standpoint. The tax disparity between debt and equity financing 
would be considerably eased. Since dividends paid would become 
deductible, one important reason for choosing the debt route dis­
appears. As dividends become deductible, equity financing be­
comes more attractive both to corporate management and to 
potential investors. By shifting to an equity source of funds, 
corporations can avoid the potentially hazardous commitment 
that accompanies debt obligations. During periods of low or 
nonexistent earnings, dividend distributions can be postponed. 
Interest and debt repayments must continue, however, if the 
business is to survive.
• Making dividend distributions deductible undoubtedly would 
increase the flow of funds from corporations to shareholders. With 
respect to lower-income shareholders, these additional spendable 
funds would lead to increased consumption power.
• Although the dividends-paid deduction has not had wide ap­
plication in the United States, it is used with various modifica­
tions in other developed countries. For example, the “split-rate” 
system in effect in West Germany is a partial deduction for divi­
dends paid.20 This does not imply that the United States should 
pattern its tax laws after other nations. However, in the inter­
national market setting, we must remain sensitive to the possibil­
ity that our tax system may place domestic corporations at a 
competitive disadvantage.
• The adoption of the dividends-paid deduction alternative would 
ease certain tax problems inherent to closely held corporations. 
Once both dividends and interest become deductible, the motiva­
tion leading toward “thin” capitalization weakens, although it 
does not disappear. Shareholders may still wish to withdraw 
some of their investment in the corporation without income tax 
consequences (that is, by means of the repayment-of-debt prin­
cipal ). Perhaps more pronounced will be the resolution of the un­
reasonable compensation issue. Except for limited situations where 
excessive salaries may be paid in order to qualify a shareholder-
20 One of the reasons why this system was adopted by West Germany was 
the hope that it would increase stock ownership by lower and middle 
income individuals.
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employee for the maximum tax on earned income (IR C  Section 
1348), preference for salaries over dividends would be neutral­
ized. The same can be said for the current practice of share­
holders’ leasing property to a corporation in order to generate a 
rental deduction. At the corporate level it does not matter whether 
the distribution is characterized as interest, salaries, or rent be­
cause all such legitimate expenditures are deductible.
Disadvantages. Several objections can be raised against the 
adoption and implementation of the dividends-paid deduction 
as a vehicle toward achieving partial integration.
• Complete integration is not achieved within the dividends-paid 
deduction alternative as it is in the partnership approach, since 
the corporate income tax would continue to apply to undistrib­
uted corporate profits. It would seem feasible, however, to par­
tially rectify this inequity by allowing some type of carryback 
and/or carryforward procedure for dividends paid in excess of 
earnings. Thus, a corporation which chose not to make a dividend 
distribution in one year and accumulated its profits instead would 
be penalized only temporarily. The corporation would be able to 
make excessive distributions in later years with carryback relief 
against the corporate income tax originally imposed. Obviously, 
such a procedure would require certain safeguards to prevent 
manipulation directed toward tax avoidance. If a carryback pro­
cedure is established, a cut-off date must be set to preclude 
dividends in excess of current earnings from leading to the refund 
of prior corporate income taxes paid. To illustrate, if the enacting 
legislation is approved in 1976, the carryback could be made ap­
plicable only to earnings and profits accumulated for tax years 
beginning after 1975.
• Another major objection might be that the dividends-paid de­
duction will penalize growing firms that need funds for expansion 
and development and accord preference to mature firms that do 
not. The answer might lie in a consent dividend procedure such 
as is currently provided for by IRC Section 565 (relating to the 
penalty tax on the unreasonable accumulation of earnings and the 
personal holding company tax). Under such a procedure, a share­
holder could agree (on a timely basis) to include in gross in­
come as a dividend a pro rata share of current undistributed
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corporate profits. As a result, the corporation would be allowed a 
dividends-paid deduction even though it retains the amount of 
the consent dividend. The shareholders who agreed to the con­
sent dividend, in turn, would increase the basis of their stock 
investment by the amount taxed but not received. However, the 
shareholders would have to use funds from other sources to pay 
the tax on the dividend.
• The dividends-paid deduction places a premium on distributions 
to shareholders that could conceivably impede economic growth 
within the corporate sector. Thus, if corporations maximize the 
deduction, what is left for capital spending? ( The answer involves 
comments stated above plus a consideration of the vagaries of 
the securities markets.) First, presuming the inclusion of an ef­
fective carryback/carryover procedure, the dividend distribution 
could be postponed with only interim tax consequences. Second, 
a consent dividend procedure would permit an immediate tax 
benefit to the corporation with the advantage of the retention of 
the funds. Third, with the increase in dividend output that the 
proposal will generate, further investor interest in equity securi­
ties might well be en co u rag ed .21 There is, of course, no way to 
know whether the inflow of equity funds would match the out­
flow of actual dividend distributions.
• Suppose a corporation making a dividend distribution has tax- 
free and/or preferentially taxed income for the year. Should the 
dividends-paid deduction be allowed in full or should it be re­
duced by the portion attributable to the nontaxable or prefer­
entially taxed income? As long as the deduction did not exceed 
the corporations taxable incom e (as determined under present 
law) for the year, there should be no need to make any such 
adjustment. If the distribution exceeds current taxable income, a 
carryback or carryover would be in order.
• Would not the provision for a dividends-paid deduction cause 
an immediate and severe revenue loss to the U.S. Treasury? That
21 One can reasonably argue that the dividends-paid deduction will enhance 
the supply of capital (that is, savings) for corporate investment. Since the 
deduction will increase after-tax income of shareholders, their propensity 
to save will increase and a large proportion of such savings might return 
to the corporate sector in the form of new equity or debt holdings.
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there would be a revenue loss can hardly be doubted.22 But then, 
any integration scheme, whether partial or complete, by definition 
must carry a similar effect. The only question is the severity of the 
loss and what can be done about it.
First, one would expect the deduction to be available only for 
the distribution of corporate profits earned after the effective date 
of the enacting legislation. Distributions of earnings accumulated 
prior to this date would not qualify. It would seem appropriate 
that the present source of dividend rules continue to apply where 
current earnings and profits would be deemed to have been dis­
tributed first. Second, recall that the dividends-paid deduction 
alternative does not envision the repeal of the corporate income 
tax—it would still apply to undistributed corporate profits. Third, 
the immediacy of any substantial losses might be avoided by some 
sort of phase-in period. For example, if the deduction is to become 
operative in 1976 it could be limited to 20 percent of the divi­
dends paid, with progression to 40 percent in 1977, 60 percent in 
1978, and so on until 100 percent is reached. Fourth, and perhaps 
most important, are the long-range effects of the proposal. If it 
is true that the dividends-paid deduction leads to economic stimu­
lation and growth, any initial revenue loss might well be com­
pensated for once the phase-in effect has passed.
• What effect, if any, would the dividends-paid deduction have 
at the state level? In those states imposing an individual income 
tax, it is doubtful that the result could be anything but an in-
2 Department of the Treasury estimates based on 1977 revenue levels re­
flect that the complete deduction at the corporate level for dividends 
paid would generate a loss of approximately $15 billion. Alternatively, 
the gross-up method would generate a revenue loss of $19 billion if the 
credit were extended to tax-exempt and foreign stockholders, and approx­
imately $12.5 billion if not so extended.
The larger revenue loss for the gross-up method results because more 
cash is at the shareholder level. This has the same effect as if the total dis­
tributions were larger, thus creating a larger revenue loss. Under the 
dividends-paid deduction method, it is the corporation which will have 
more cash. If it distributed all that additional cash to its shareholders, the 
revenue loss would be the same as under the gross-up method (that is, 
larger dividends would appear at the shareholder level). Over time, it is 
probable that there will be some increase in the level of dividends under 
the deduction method and, therefore, a somewhat greater loss than the 
$15 billion indicated.
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crease in revenue. Because the prospect of the federal deduction 
will stimulate dividend distributions, more income will be subject 
to state and local taxes in the hands of recipient shareholders. 
Unless states levying corporate income taxes also permit a divi­
dends-paid deduction, there should be no offsetting loss from this
source.
The "Gross-Up'' Method
Like the dividends-paid deduction alternative, the gross-up 
method depends on retention of the corporate income tax. But in­
stead of focusing on the corporation, relief is provided at the 
shareholder level. Under this proposal a shareholder includes in 
gross income the net dividends received plus the corporate in­
come tax attributable to such dividends (that is, the dividends 
would be “grossed up”). The shareholder then computes the in­
come tax in the regular manner but is permitted to claim as a tax 
credit the amount of the gross-up. In effect, the corporate income 
tax is withheld by the corporation on behalf of its shareholders 
then passed through to them as a credit when dividends are dis­
tributed. Several observations, both pro and con, can be made 
about this attractive method of partial integration.
In terms of tax equity, the result would parallel that achieved 
under the dividends-paid deduction alternative. Thus, vertical and 
horizontal tax equity would be achieved for distributed profits 
but not for those accumulated.
Under the gross-up method, dividends would become more at­
tractive to the investor than interest.23 The taxpayer, in addition
23 Although dividend income and interest income are taxed at the same 
effective rate under the gross-up method, a dollar’s worth of interest in­
come received by the taxpayer is not equivalent to a dollar’s worth of 
dividend income. For example, a 30 percent tax bracket taxpayer receives 
$156 in dividends on which the distributing corporation has paid $144 in 
corporate taxes ($300 X 48 percent rate). Although the taxpayer’s gross 
income includes both the $156 dividend and the $144 gross-up, the tax 
credit of $144 (which accompanies the dividend income) is $100.80 
greater than the $43.20 tax (at the marginal rate) on the gross-up 
amount. The economic benefit of the $156 dividend received by the tax­
payer is $210 ($1.56—($156 +  $144 gross-up X 30 percent) +  $144 
credit).
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to receiving dividend income, also would receive a tax credit that 
would more than off set the additional tax liability attributable to 
the inclusion of the grossed-up amount. Thus, since dividend in­
come is preferred by the investor over interest income, some 
easing of the preference for debt over equity financing would seem 
bound to occur. But, because dividends are not deductible to the 
corporation, those in control of corporate policy are still apt to 
lean toward debt and the accompanying interest deduction. One 
might surmise, therefore, that the gross-up method would lessen 
disparity between debt and equity investments but not to the ex­
tent anticipated under the dividends-paid deduction alternative.
In comparing the gross-up method with the dividends-paid 
deduction alternative, one important advantage in favor of the 
former is the effect on corporate accumulations. Since the corpo­
rate income tax must be paid whether profits are distributed or 
not, the incentive to distribute dividends would not be nearly as 
co m p ellin g .24 Thus, the gross-up method would be more advanta­
geous for new and growth corporations planning little or no divi­
dend payout.25
The gross-up method should do much to ease the problem of 
accumulations by closely held corporations which are motivated 
by the avoidance of tax at the shareholder level ( that is, the matter 
dealt with in IRC Secs. 531-537 and 541-547). In other words, 
shielding shareholders from dividend income is less apt to occur 
if the distributions entitle them to a tax credit.
As has been suggested for the dividends-paid deduction, provi­
sion should be made to preclude retroactive application to years
24 One might expect, however, a definite improvement in corporate—share­
holder relations and communication. Shareholders will certainly apply 
pressure on corporate management to account for dividend pay-out po­
tential. Along the same vein, it can be anticipated that corporate policy 
as to dividend distributions will have a definite impact on investment 
decisions.
25 A variation of the gross-up method would allow the corporation to allocate 
dividends to its shareholders without any accompanying distribution. 
Known as the Carter Commission proposal, such a procedure resembles 
the consent dividend approach suggested in connection with the divi­
dends-paid deduction but with the tax consequences falling at the share­
holder level. For an excellent discussion of the Carter proposal see Mc­
Clure’s article cited in note 18, pp. 569-74.
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prior to the effective date of the enacting legislation. Thus, corpo­
rate taxes paid and attributable to profits accumulated before that 
date would not be eligible for gross-up and credit treatment.
Some form of the gross-up method has been adopted by other 
developed countries (for example, France, Canada, and The 
United Kingdom. See Appendix 2 ).
If the United States denies integrated tax treatment ( except on 
a treaty basis) to foreign shareholders, the gross-up method 
would be preferable to the dividends-paid deduction alternative. 
This is true from a compliance and administration standpoint, 
since the corporation, under the gross-up method, would be 
spared the burden of having to determine the citizenship status of 
each of its shareholders.
One problem posed by the gross-up method arises with respect 
to determining the corporate tax attributable to the dividend dis­
tribution.26 An exact allocation approach, seemingly the most 
equitable in terms of its result, could become very complex if ad­
justments are to be made for income from tax-free sources.
In the interest of taxpayers in similar situations, the credit al­
lowed for the amount of the gross-up should not be limited to 
the shareholder’s tax liability generated by the dividends or by his 
overall tax liability. Any other approach would penalize share­
holders in low marginal tax brackets. Although certain policy 
considerations may dictate otherwise, the gross-up procedure 
should not be available to shareholders that are tax-exempt 
organizations.27
The withholding alternative could cause some instability at the 
shareholder level when determining the final income tax in any 
one year. Later modifications of corporate income tax liability, 
either by action of the IRS or through other events, might well
26 If corporate profits are retained and distributed in later years it would, of 
course, be necessary to keep track of the attributable corporate tax. In 
terms of the order of distribution, one would anticipate the use of the 
LIFO approach where distribution would be deemed paid from most re­
cent earnings. This is akin to the present structure where distribution first 
originates from current earnings and profits.
27 Quite simply, the gross-up method off ers greater flexibility than the divi­
dends-paid deduction approach in controlling the tax consequences to tax- 
exempt and foreign shareholders.
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change the gross-up computation of previous distributions. In 
such cases, aff ected shareholders may be required to file amended 
returns. In this regard, the dividends-paid deduction would create 
less difficulty, since only the corporation is aff ected by subsequent 
adjustments to prior tax y e a r s . 28 (The gross-up alternative is illus­
trated in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix 3.)
28 The problem is somewhat similar to the situation under present law when 
a shareholder treats a distribution as a return of capital and such distribu­
tion later turns out to be covered by adequate earnings and profits.
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APPENDIX 1
History of the Taxation
of Corporate-Source Income
in the United States : 1909 to 1975
Beginning in 1913 with the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
the United States has maintained two distinct systems of taxing 
corporate-source income. Corporations have been subject to an income 
tax on their net earnings, while individual shareholders have been 
subject to an income tax on corporate distributions. The taxing statutes 
have provided little relief at the individual shareholder level to take 
into account the taxes paid by the corporation.
The Corporate Income Tax
The federal government has taxed the income of corporations con­
tinuously since the enactment of the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909. This 
first tax was not an income tax as such, but rather an “excise” tax im­
posed upon the exercise of the privilege of doing business in the cor­
porate capacity. The tax was one percent of net income in excess of 
$5,000.
This excise tax on corporate income was superseded in 1913 follow­
ing the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment which empowered Con­
gress to tax income “from whatever source derived.” In its place was 
substituted a bona fide “income” tax on the net earnings of the corpo­
ration. Then, as now, the tax was imposed directly upon the corpora­
tion under the notion that it is a distinct, judicial person—a taxpaying 
entity separate from its shareholders. Except for one brief two-year 
period in its 63-year history (1936-1938), the tax has not discriminated 
between earnings retained by the corporation and earnings distributed 
to its shareholders.
Federal corporate income tax rates have shown a general upward 
trend since their first enactment in 1913. From  1913 to the end of the 
first World W ar in 1918, rates were gradually increased to 12 percent. 
During the 1920s they ranged from 10 to 13.5 percent. Graduated cor­
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porate tax rates, first introduced in 1936, ranged from 8 percent to 15 
percent and were supplemented by a graduated surtax ranging from 
7 percent to 27 percent on undistributed profits. In 1938, the surtax on 
undistributed profits was removed, and the graduated rates were lim­
ited to corporations with net earnings of $25,000 or less.
Tax rates of 25 percent to 40 percent were imposed throughout 
World War II. During those years a special excess profits tax brought 
the maximum combined effective tax rate on corporate earnings to 80 
percent. Effective rates for the remainder of the decade ranged from 
21 percent to 38 percent.
In 1950 the graduated tax rates for corporations with taxable in­
comes of $25,000 or less were replaced with a single normal tax rate 
applicable to the full amount of taxable income and a surtax applicable 
to all taxable income in excess of $25,000. From 1950 to 1953 (the 
Korean War period) the normal tax rate was 30 percent and the sur­
tax rate was 22 percent. Those were supplemented by a 30 percent 
excess profits tax, which expired at the close of 1953. It wasn’t until 
the Revenue Act of 1964 that the normal and the surtax rates were 
changed. The normal rate was reduced to 22 percent and the surtax 
rate was increased to 26 percent, and both rates have continued in 
effect since 1965. In 1968 and 1969, however, an additional 10 percent 
surcharge was imposed. It was reduced to 2.5 percent in 1970 and 
subsequently eliminated altogether. For 1975 only, the normal tax was 
20 percent for the first $25,000 and 22 percent for taxable income in 
excess of $25,000. The surtax rate continued to be 26 percent but, 
again, in 1975 only, the surtax exemption was temporarily increased to 
$50,000.
The graph opposite shows the standard rates imposed by the fed­
eral government on taxable corporate income over $25,000 between 
1909 and 1975 inclusive.* No account was taken of excess profits taxes.
Taxation of Corporate Distributions
Individual shareholders. Prior to 1954, dividend income (that is 
distributions out of the “earnings and profits” of a corporation) was 
taxable as income to the individual stockholder in the same manner as 
any other item of gross income. No effect was given to the fact that 
corporate earnings, out of which the dividend was distributed, had 
been previously subjected to the corporate income tax. The 1954 Code, 
by the enactment of IRC Secs. 34 and 116, introduced two forms of
* The 1975 rate applies to income in excess of $50,000.
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limited relief from this “double taxation” of corporate profits. Those 
provisions represented the nation’s first attempt at “integration” of the 
corporate and individual income taxes, and their expressed purpose 
was to halt the trend toward debt financing and to encourage invest­
ment in the equity capital of corporations.
As introduced in 1954, the integration scheme had two components— 
a limited exclusion from gross income and a limited credit against tax. 
The exclusion provision (Sec. 116) permitted an individual to exclude 
from his gross income the first $50 of dividends received during the 
taxable year. This provision applied to the dividend income received 
by each taxpayer. A husband and wife were each entitled an exclusion 
of up to $50 if they both had dividend income, whether filing jointly 
or separately.
S o u r c e : “Income Taxes Around the World,” Monthly Economic Letter, (First 
National City Bank) May 1968, p. 58. Reprinted with permission.
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The credit provision (IR C  Sec. 3 4 ) , on the other hand, let an indi­
vidual taxpayer reduce his gross income tax liability by an amount 
equal to 4 percent of all the dividends received from domestic corpo­
rations which had been included in his or her gross income (that is, 
the credit was computed on the amount of dividend income net of the 
amount of the dividend exclusion). However, the credit reduction in 
tax liability could not exceed 4 percent of taxable income, and in no 
event could it exceed his income tax liability for that year. Thus, there 
was no carryover or carryback of any excess credit, nor was the tax­
payer entitled to any refund due to excess credit. Unlike the exclusion 
( computed on the basis of separate ownership), the credit for married 
taxpayers was computed on the basis of combined dividends, combined 
taxable income, and combined income tax liabilities.
The Revenue Act of 1964 retained, and even enlarged, the exclusion 
(from $50 to $100) but eliminated the credit. The credit was reduced  
to 2 percent in 1964 and no credit was allowed for dividends received 
after 1964. The reasons for the credit repeal, (as stated in the related 
congressional committee reports) were these:
• The notion that the dividend credit would encourage investment 
was not borne out by events that had occurred since its enactment in 
1954.
• From  the standpoint of making funds available for investment in 
corporate enterprises, it was felt that the reduction (in 1964) of the 
corporate income tax rates, plus the recent enactment of the invest­
ment credit, could be expected to have a more important impact than 
any reduction directed solely toward distributed corporate income.
• The credit reduced any double taxation by a much larger amount 
for higher income bracket shareholders than it did for those in the 
lower income brackets.
Neither the exclusion nor the credit have ever been allowed with 
respect to dividends received from tax-exempt organizations, foreign 
corporations, corporations in business in possessions of the United 
States, China Trade Act corporations, or (for years prior to 1958) in­
surance companies. The so-called dividends of mutual savings banks, 
cooperative banks, and building and loan associations are also in­
eligible.
Corporate Shareholders. Relief from double taxation has long 
been granted to intercorporate dividends. If this were not the case, 
such dividends might become subject to taxation any number of times
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prior to their ultimate distribution to individual shareholders. Under 
the 1918, 1921, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1932, and 1934 Revenue Acts, cor­
porations were allowed a deduction for 100 percent of dividends re­
ceived from most domestic corporations. The 1934 Revenue A ct was 
amended in 1935 to reduce the amount of the deduction to 90 percent. 
The deduction was changed to a credit in 1936 and continued through 
the 1939 code at a rate which was further reduced to 85 percent.
Currently, corporate shareholders are entitled to a deduction of 85 
percent of dividends received from most domestic corporations. W here 
the dividends are received from other members of “affiliated” groups 
( that is, corporations at least 80 percent of whose stock is owned by a 
common parent corporation), the allowable deduction is generally 
100 percent of such dividends. As in the past, special rules and lim­
itations apply to dividends received from certain corporations, such as 




A Comparative Summary of Current 
Tax Systems in Selected Countries*
Many countries maintain a two-tier system of taxation with respect 
to corporate-source income. Corporate net income, or profit, is first 
taxed at the corporate level, and any dividends paid to shareholders 
are again taxed at graduated individual rates. Such a system gives 
rise to full economic double taxation in that little or no relief is granted 
at either the corporate or the shareholder levels for the tax imposed on 
the other. No effect is accorded the notion that the corporation is 
nothing more than the aggregate of its shareholders and thus has no 
taxpaying ability beyond that of its shareholders. The corporation is a 
distinct, legal, taxpaying entity, separate from its shareholders.
An important exception to the double taxation treatment, however, 
is generally accorded to corporate shareholders. Intercorporate divi­
dends are exempted, in whole or in part, from the corporate income 
tax. If this were not the case, corporate earnings could be taxed two 
or more times prior to being taxed at the individual shareholder level.
In contrast to the two-tier, or “unintegrated,” system of taxing cor­
porate profits, many countries in recent years have adopted taxing 
provisions designed to mitigate the incidence of full economic double 
taxation. Such integrated systems have directed the relief in some 
cases, to the corporate level by using some sort of “split rate” device 
(analogous to the dividends-paid deduction alternative). In other in­
stances, by means of a gross-up mechanism, the shareholder level be-
* For a more complete discussion, see Richard M. Hammer, “The Taxation 
of Income From Corporate Shareholders: Review of Present Systems in 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the U.K.,” National Tax Journal, 
September, 1975, pp. 315-333.
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comes the focal point of such relief. A few countries eff ec t integration 
by directing partial relief to each level.
Under a split-rate system, the tax rate imposed on distributed earn­
ings is substantially less than the rate applicable to earnings retained 
by the corporation; since it is only the distributed earnings or divi­
dends that will be taxed [at graduated rates] to the shareholders upon 
receipt. In some countries, this treatment is modified by allowing the 
corporation a full or partial “dividends-paid” deduction. All, or a 
portion of the amount of earnings paid out as dividends is deducted 
from the corporation’s net income and the remainder is taxed at stan­
dard rates.
The “gross-up” method (sometimes referred to as the “withholding” 
or “credit” method) taxes all corporate income at standard rates. The 
shareholder generally includes in his gross income the full amount of 
the dividend received plus all, or in most cases a portion of, the tax 
paid by the corporation on such distributed earnings (that is, the 
grossed-up amount). The amount of the gross-up is then allowed as a 
credit against his personal income tax liability. In theory, where the 
corporation and shareholder are residents of the same taxing jurisdic­
tion, either a “credit” method or a “split-rate” method could be imple­
mented to achieve the same tax results.
The following table briefly summarizes the various systems of 
corporate-source income taxation currently employed in Germany, 
Japan, Finland, Norway, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and 
Greece. The scope of this review is limited to the taxation of dividends 
paid by a domestic corporation out of non-foreign-source income to its 
domestic shareholders.
Germany
Resident corporations are eligible for a reduced tax rate of 15 per­
cent on earnings distributed to shareholders. Retained earnings are 
taxed at a rate of 51 percent. The earnings used to pay either tax are 
treated as retained earnings and are thereby taxed at the 51 percent 
rate. Constructive dividends or “hidden distributions” are not eligible 
for the split-rate treatment.
The split rate applies equally to dividends paid to individual and 
corporate shareholders. Dividends received by individuals are subject 
to the graduated personal income tax. Dividends received by another 
domestic corporation are taxed as income to that corporation unless— •
• The recipient corporation directly holds at least 25  percent of the 
share capital of the distributing corporation.
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• The recipient corporation redistributes such dividends to its share­
holders in the same year. However, to the extent these dividends are 
retained by the corporation, they are taxed at the 51 percent rate.
Year of adoption: 1953.
Japan
Integration is directed toward relief at both the corporate and the 
shareholder levels, although the credit system (at the shareholder 
level) is of less importance today than in previous years.
A split-rate system applies the following tax rates to corporations 





Y100,000,000 (U.S. $330,000) 
Corporations capitalized 
at less than 
Y100,000,000-
a. Income of more than 
Y7,000,000 annually
b. Income of not more than 
Y7,000,000 annually
Rate on income ear- 
Rate on marked for or




On the individual shareholder level, the full amount of the dividend 
(cash received plus the amount of a 15 percent tax on the dividend 
withheld at source) is includable in the individual’s gross income. 
Gross income is reduced by allowable deductions to arrive at taxable 
income against which graduated rates are applied. The 15 percent tax 
withheld at source plus a special 10 percent dividend-received credit 
are applied against the individual’s gross tax liability. When the tax­
payer’s taxable income is greater than ¥10,000,000 (U.S. $33,000), the 
amount of the dividend-received credit is reduced, but never below 5 
percent of dividends received. Domestic corporate shareholders are 
not taxed on dividends received provided their dividend distribution 
is equal to the dividends received. If a lesser amount is distributed, 
then 25 percent of the diff erence (between the amount of dividends 





to avoid the tax) is included in the corporate shareholder’s income 
and taxed as retained earnings.
Year of adoption: 1961.
Finland and Norway
Both countries direct integration relief to the corporate level by 
allowing the corporation a deduction for dividends paid.
Finnish law allows a deduction in the amount of 40 percent of cash 
dividends declared (100  percent for dividends declared on newly is­
sued stock), which reduces the corporate tax rate on distributed earn­
ings from 43 percent to, at most, 25.8 percent.
Norway permits a 100 percent deduction for dividends paid. Thus, 
only retained profits are subjected to the 27 percent corporate tax rate. 
Significant local taxes, however, are levied at the same rate upon both 
distributed and undistributed income.
In both countries, dividends received are fully taxed to the ultimate 
individual shareholder.
Year of adoption: Finland—1965 or earlier; N orway—1970.
Canada
Integration relief is achieved at the shareholder level by means of a 
dividend tax credit applied against the individual shareholder’s per­
sonal income tax. Intercompany dividends, in most cases, are entirely 
exempted from taxation. The corporate income tax rate in Canada is 
47 percent (4 6  percent in 1976 and subsequent years). Low er rates 
are available to small businesses and other corporations with respect 
to their net manufacturing and processing income.
The individual taxpayer must include in his gross income four-thirds 
of the cash dividend received. He may then claim an amount approxi­
mately equal to the gross-up (one-third of the dividend) as a credit 
against his individual income tax otherwise due. If the credit results 
in an overpayment, a cash refund is available.
Year of adoption: 1972.
France
France achieves integration at the shareholder level by employing 
an imputed credit system. Both individual and corporate portfolio 
shareholders (that is, corporations with less than a 10 percent share­
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holding) receive a credit against income tax of 50 percent of dividends 
received. These shareholders include in their gross income the full 
amount of dividends received plus 50 percent of that amount (the  
amount of the credit). The tax liability is reduced by the amount of 
the credit. If the credit results in a tax overpayment, an individual 
shareholder is entitled to a cash refund. Such a refund is not available 
to corporate portfolio shareholders, who lose the benefit of any excess 
credit.
The corporate tax rate is 50 percent. Intercompany dividends, net of 
expense incurred by the corporate shareholder in relation to deriving 
such income, are exempted from the tax if—
• The corporate shareholder owns at least 10 percent of the issued 
shares of the corporation from which the dividends are received.
• The corporate shareholder either subscribed to the shares at the time 
of issue or promises to hold them ( or has held them ) for at least two 
years from the time of purchase.
The effect of extending the exemption to “net dividends” rather than 
total dividends is to impose a tax of about 4 percent on the total 
amount of intercompany dividends received. See R. M. Hammer, cited 
in note on page 30, for a derivation of this percentage.
Year of adoption: 1965.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom integrates at the shareholder level. Under this 
system, the dividend-paying corporation must make an “advance pay­
ment” against its current-year corporate income tax liability in an 
amount equal to 49 percent of any dividends it distributes. The indi­
vidual shareholder must gross up the dividend by including in his 
gross income the full amount of the dividend plus the corporation’s 
related advanced payment. He then reduces his tax liability by the 
amount of the advanced payment. Cash refunds are available.
Distributions received by domestic corporate shareholders, including 
the related advanced payment credit of 49 percent, are fully exempted 
from the recipient’s corporate tax (52  percent). No minimum share­
holding in the distributing corporation is required of the recipient 
corporation. Furthermore, the advance payments made by the distrib­
uting corporation (with respect to the dividends paid to the recipient 
shareholder corporation) are used as credits against the amount of ad­
vanced payments owed by the recipient corporation.
Year of adoption: 1973.
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Greece
Double taxation is entirely avoided; income from corporate sources 
is taxed only once. Distributed dividends are totally exempt from taxa­
tion at the corporate level but are taxed in full to shareholders. Re­
tained earnings are taxed to the corporation ( at a generally applicable 
effective rate of about 38 percent), but the tax is refundable when the 
earnings are subsequently distributed.
Year of adoption: 1958.
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APPENDIX 3
Comparison of Consequences 
Under Various Approaches
The following tables illustrate the mechanics of taxing $300 of cor­
porate net earnings under the current U.S. law, and the proposed full 
“dividends-paid” deduction method, the “gross-up” method, and the 
“half-and-half” method. In each case, it is assumed that the corporation 
distributes to its shareholders the full amount of its after-tax earnings. 
Neither the $25,000 corporate surtax exemption, nor the $100 exclusion 
applicable to the shareholders’ annual dividend income is taken into 
account.
Table 1, below, describes the tax consequences of an individual 
shareholder in the 30 percent tax bracket, while table 2, page 38, per­
tains to such consequences of a 70 percent tax bracket shareholder.













(taxable income) $300 $300 $300 $300
Dividends-paid 156 300 156 205.26
Dividend-deduction — 300 — 102.63
Taxable income 300 — 300 197.37
Tax (48%) 144 — 144 94.74
Retained earnings - - - -
Individual Level
Dividend received $156 $300 $156 $205.26
Gross-up — — 144 102.63
Taxable income 156 300 300 307.89
Tax—before credit (30%) 46.80 90 90 92.37
Credit — — 144 102.63
Tax—after credit — — (54) (10.26)
Total Tax $190.80 $ 90 $ 90 $ 84.48
Effective rate 63.6% 30% 30% 28.16%
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Under the “half-and-half” method, the corporation is entitled to a 
deduction for one-half of the dividends paid to its shareholders. The 
individual shareholder would gross up his dividend by adding to his 
taxable income an amount equal to one-half of the dividends received 
and would then take a tax credit equal to the gross-up. The corporate 





















The total tax paid on the
$300 of corporate net earnings is
Thus, the effective rate of tax imposed on 
dividend income received by a 30% 










As can be seen from this example, the combination of a 50 percent 
dividends-paid deduction and a 50 percent gross-up and credit, when 
combined with the 48 percent corporate rate, would more than elimi­
nate the double tax. One or the other would need to be adjusted 
slightly.
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(Taxable Income) $300 $300 $300 $300
Dividends-paid 156 300 156 205.26
Dividend-deduction — 300 — 102.63
Taxable income 300 — 300 197.37
Tax (48%) 144 — 144 94.74
Retained earnings - - - -
Individual Level 
Dividend received $156 $300 $156 $205.26
Gross-up — — 144 102.63
Taxable income 156 300 300 307.89
Tax—before credit (70%) 109.20 210 210 215.52
Credit — — 144 102.63
Tax—after credit - - 66 112.89
Total Tax $253.20 $210 $210 $207.63
Effective rate 84.4% 70% 70% 69.21%
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